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This paper presents a continuous-time model of exchange rates relying not
only on macroeconomic factors but also having an investor heterogeneity com-
ponent. The driving macroeconomic factor is the domestic-foreign interest rate
differential, while the investor heterogeneity is described by the expectations of
boundedly rational portfolio managers who use a weighted average of the expecta-
tions of fundamentalists and chartists. Within this framework, the different roles
of the macroeconomic factor and investor heterogeneity on the determination of
the exchange rate are examined explicitly. We show that this simple model gener-
ates very complicated market behaviour, including the existence of multiple steady
state equilibria, deviations of the market exchange rate from the fundamental, and
market fluctuations. Numerical simulation of the corresponding stochastic version
of the model shows that the model is able to generate typical time series and
volatility clustering patterns observed in exchange rate markets.
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1 Introduction
In the traditional macro-structure paradigm that underpins the influential rational
expectations Dornbusch (1976) model, exchange rate determination is based on macroe-
conomic fundamental factors, in particular interest rates and monetary policy. However,
many empirical studies of exchange rates have shown that there are often large move-
ments in exchange rates that are apparently unexplained by macroeconomic fundamental
factors. Sometimes, the market exchange rate can deviate from its fundamental equi-
librium and stabilise at some non-fundamental levels for quite long periods of time. In
particular, Meese and Rogoff (1983) show that a random walk model out-performs stan-
dard open economy macroeconomic models in explaining exchange rate movements. The
weak explanatory power of macroeconomic factors on the exchange rate is referred to as
the exchange rate puzzle or anomaly (see Lyons, 2001). Over the last two decades, an
increasing number of anomalies and puzzles have been uncovered in empirical research.
These anomalies or puzzles include, for example, (i) the “disconnect” puzzle, referring to
the fact that exchange rates appear to be disconnected from their underlying fundamen-
tal factors most of the time (see Williamson, 1985), (ii) the “excess volatility” puzzle,
whereby the volatility of exchange rates by far exceeds the volatility of their underlying
economic variables (see Baxter and Stockman, 1989 and Flood and Rose, 1995), and (iii)
the stylised facts referring to the non-normality, fat tails and power-law behaviour of ex-
change rate returns (see Lux, 1998, Lux and Marchesi, 2001 and LeBaron, 2006). We
refer to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) for more discussion of these empirical anoma-
lies. The foregoing comments suggest that explanations of exchange rate movements
based solely on macroeconomic fundamental factors are unsatisfactory. As a result, the
attention of researchers has moved away from the examination simply of macroeconomic
factors, towards taking into account the structure of the foreign exchange, in particular
by considering the heterogeneity and bounded rationality of investors.
Empirical literature on survey data, in particular Ito (1990), Allen and Taylor (1990),
Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkhoff (1998), Chinn and Frankel (2002) and more recently
Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) provide evidence of heterogeneity and bounded rationality
of the investors in exchange rate markets. These studies show the widespread influence
of foreign exchange fundamental analysts who base their predictions on macroeconomic
fundamental factors and technical analysts who base their predictions purely on the
identification of supposedly recurring patterns in exchange rate movements. So models
seeking to explain exchange rate movements should incorporate both of these elements.
Over the last two decades, the literature on models of heterogeneous agents who are
boundedly rational in speculative markets has developed rapidly. In order to explain
the US dollar’s behaviour in the 1980s, Frankel and Froot (1986) consider an exchange
rate model with three classes of agents: fundamentalists who believe the Dornbusch over-
shooting model, chartists who believe that the exchange rate follows a random walk, and
portfolio managers who form their expectations as a weighted average of the predictions
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of the fundamentalists and chartists. The framework of Frankel and Froot departs from
the rational expectations orthodoxy, by virtue of the fact that the three types of agents
are boundedly rational rather than fully rational. They find that the portfolio managers
learn more slowly about the model than they change it by revising a linear combination
of chartist and fundamentalist views they incorporate in their own forecasts, which leads
to the take-off of bubbles. In addition, the fundamental equilibrium of the model may
not be stable and the exchange rate may stabilise around a value that is far from the
fundamental equilibrium. Recently, some exchange rate models that study jointly the
dynamics of speculative and macroeconomic forces and other exchange rate models that
solely focus on the behaviour of speculators have been developed. See Westerhoff and
Reitz (2003), Westerhoff (2003), Reitz and Taylor (2008) and Westerhoff (2010). These
models are able to mimic the dynamics of foreign exchange markets and provide some
policy implications such as central bank intervention. For the aspect of asset pricing,
by incorporating bounded rationality and heterogeneity, various heterogeneous agent
models have successfully explained many types of features (such as market booms and
crashes, long deviations of the market price from the fundamental price), the stylized
facts (such as skewness, kurtosis, volatility clustering and fat tails of returns), and various
power laws (such as the long memory in return volatility) observed in financial markets.
We refer the reader to Hommes (2006), Hommes and Wagener (2009), LeBaron (2006),
Chiarella et al. (2009) and Westerhoff (2010) for surveys of the recent developments in
this literature.
This paper seeks to revisit the Dornbusch overshooting mechanism in light of the
understanding that macroeconomic factors alone are not the driver of exchange rate
movements. We present a continuous-time model of exchange rate dynamics containing
both macroeconomic and investor heterogeneity elements. The macroeconomic funda-
mental factor is determined by the domestic-foreign interest rate differential, whilst the
investor heterogeneity is characterised by the expectations of the portfolio managers.
From Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990a, 1990b), we borrow the idea that the expectations
of the portfolio managers are a function of the weighted average of the expectations of
fundamentalists and chartists. However unlike in Frankel and Froot (1986), this func-
tion is nonlinear instead of linear, the nonlinearity being due to the cautiousness of the
portfolio managers as weighted expectations take extreme values. The incorporation of
fundamentalists and chartists allows for the bounded rationality of the heterogeneous
investors rather than the full rationality that is usually proposed and that creates an
“infinite regress” problem, as argued in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). Within our
framework, we are able to examine explicitly the different roles of the macroeconomic
fundamental factor and investor heterogeneity on the determination of the exchange rate.
By the introduction of cautiousness into the expectations of the portfolio managers, we
provide a channel for the market exchange rate to deviate from and fluctuate around
the fundamental exchange rate. It is this channel, which is missing from the current
literature, and that turns out to play a very important role on the stability of non-
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fundamental equilibrium exchange rates and the complicated exchange rate behaviour
observed in exchange rate markets. We show that the long-run convergence of the funda-
mental equilibrium exchange rate is related to the macroeconomic fundamental factors
and the persistent fluctuations are due to the heterogeneity of the investors. Numerical
simulations of the stochastic version of the model show that the model is able to generate
the broad features of typical time series behaviour and volatility clustering observed in
exchange rate markets.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we lay out an exchange rate model
with nonlinear heterogeneous beliefs in a continuous-time framework. Based on this
model, Section 3 analyses the existence of fundamental and non-fundamental steady
states. In Section 4, the stability of the fundamental steady state is analysed based on
three types of market expectations, those of the fundamentalists, the chartists and then
a weighted average of both groups. The conditions and mechanisms under which the
exchange rate will deviate from its fundamental value are highlighted. In Section 5, we
consider the effect of market noise and Markov switching of the weighting process on the
exchange rate market. Some conclusions are given in Section 6. Proofs of some technical
results are given in the appendices.
2 The Model
The classical Dornbusch (1976) model, which incorporates perfect myopic foresight in
predicting exchange rate changes, displays a saddle-point structure. Under the rational
expectations assumption of the Dornbusch model, any unanticipated discrete jump in
money supply leads to an immediate discrete jump in the exchange rate and the magni-
tude of this jump is assumed to be precisely that necessary to move the system from its
present state onto the stable arm of the saddle point associated with the new equilibrium
(see Gray and Turnovsky, 1979 for a very elegant and detailed discussion of this issue).
This is the underlying factor behind the well-known overshooting of the exchange rate,
which was the important idea introduced by the Dornbusch model.
The model we develop modifies the Dornbusch model by incorporating macroeco-
nomic fundamental factors and the market activity of heterogeneous investors. This
means that the market exchange rate is determined not only by the macroeconomic
fundamental factors, such as the interest rate differential, but also by the activities of
portfolio managers in the market who aggregate in a certain way the expectations of fun-
damentalists and chartists. More precisely, consider an exchange rate market populated
by many portfolio managers who use a weighted average of the expectations of funda-
mentalists and chartists as specified below. The following notation is used throughout
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this paper.
R∗ : the foreign (nominal) rate of interest, taken to be exogenous;
R : the domestic (nominal) interest rate;
Xm, Xf , Xc : the expected rate of exchange depreciation by the portfolio managers,
fundamentalists and chartists, respectively;
E : the logarithm of the current exchange rate, measured in units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency;
P : the logarithm of the domestic price level;
M : the logarithm of the domestic nominal money supply, taken to be exogenous;
Y : the logarithm of the domestic real output, taken to be exogenous.
The fundamentalists believe that the depreciation of the spot rate should regress
to the fundamental value, which is determined by the interest rate parity condition.





where βf > 0 is a constant. Equation (2.1) states that the expectations of the funda-
mentalists of the rate of exchange depreciation Xf form a mean-reverting process to the
nominal interest rate differential R−R∗, with βf measuring the speed of adjustment of
the mean-reverting process. In the special case where the speed of the adjustment of
the fundamentalists is infinite, βf = ∞, it follows from (1/βf )X˙f = R − R∗ −Xf that
R−R∗ = Xf , which is the interest rate parity condition.
In contrast, the chartists use some technical methods to attempt to discover the trend
of the market exchange rate. Here we assume that they believe that the change of the
log-exchange rate follows a weighted average of past changes of the log-exchange rate1,
that is
X˙c = βc(E˙ −Xc), (2.2)
where βc > 0 measures the speed of adjustment of the chartists to the change of the
log-exchange rate or their rate of extrapolation to the log-exchange rate trend. In the
special case where the speed of the adjustment of the chartists is infinite, βc = ∞, it
follows from (1/βc)X˙c = (E˙ − Xc) that Xc = E˙, that is the chartists would have a
perfect foresight expectation2.
1If we use dE(s) to represent the instantaneous log-exchange rate change at time s in the continuous
time case, we can define Xc(t) = βc
∫ t
−∞ e
−βc(t−s)dE(s), which is a declining weighted average of past
log-exchange rate changes, then this can be rewritten as (2.2). In the discrete time case, we can define
Xct+∆t = βc(Et+∆t − Et) + (1− βc)Xct , which leads to (2.2) in the limit as ∆t→ 0.
2The perfect foresight case is also discussed by Gray and Turnovsky (1979) within the framework of
the Dornbusch (1976) model.
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The portfolio managers are the investors who actually buy and sell foreign assets
in the market. Their decision is based on an aggregate of the expectations of the fun-
damentalists and chartists of the change in the log-exchange rate. We could think of
the portfolio managers as being in a large financial institution that employs groups of
fundamental analysts and groups who engage in technical analysis of market data. The
role of the managers is to blend these two sources of information in some fashion. We
assume that they do this by taking a weighted average of the expectations of the fun-
damentalists and chartists, so that the expected rate of exchange depreciation of the
portfolio managers is given by
Xm = H
(
(1− ω)Xf + ωXc), ω ∈ [0, 1], (2.3)
where ω and 1−ω represent the market fractions that the portfolio managers attach to the
expectations of the chartists and fundamentalists, respectively, and H(·) is a function of
the expectations mix that is nonlinear due to the cautiousness of the portfolio managers
and is discussed further below.
Exchange Rate Determination—A general model of log-exchange rate adjust-
ment is assumed to be of the form
E˙ = Xm + Z, (2.4)
where Xm is the expected rate of exchange depreciation of the portfolio managers de-
fined by (2.3) and Z represents some macroeconomic fundamental factor, which here is
assumed to be determined by the nominal interest rate differential, so that
Z = βR(R
∗ −R), (2.5)
where βR > 0 is a constant, measuring the impact of the fundamental factor on the
exchange depreciation in the market. In order to remain within the spirit of the original
Dornbusch model we assume that the interest rate differential is the main driver of
exchange rate variation in the macroeconomic fundamental factor. Of course other macro
fundamental factors could also be included in Z, but we take (2.5) for simplicity.
The first term on the right hand side of (2.4), as in Frankel and Froot (1986), can be
thought of as capturing the speculative factors in the market. Here these come from a
nonlinear combination of heterogeneous expectations, described by (2.3). The function
H(x) = µh(x) where µ > 0 is a constant scaling factor and h(·) is a nonlinear function
satisfying3
h(0) = 0, h′(0) = 1, lim
x→±∞
h′(x) = 0, and h′′(x)x < 0 for x 6= 0. (2.6)
Thus the function H is an S-shaped function and is illustrated in Fig. 2.1 for different
scaling factors. Note that µ = H ′(0) = maxxH ′(x) measures the weight that the port-
folio managers put on the expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists when their
expected rates of exchange depreciation are near zero.
3The choice of this functional form is also motivated by the literature (such as Chiarella, Dieci and
Gardini, 2002) on heterogeneous agent asset pricing models.
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Figure 2.1 here
Intuitively, when the deviation of the exchange rate from the fundamental equilibrium
increases, the impact of the macroeconomic fundamental factor dominates the bounded
nonlinear function in equation (2.4) so that the exchange rate is mean-reverting to the
fundamental equilibrium, as will be demonstrated later. The function H captures the
cautiousness of the portfolio managers with regard to the speculative elements in the
market. That is, portfolio managers are more confident in the aggregate expected rate
of depreciation of the fundamentalists and chartists when it is small, and become less
confident or more cautious as it becomes larger in absolute value. For example, when
the macroeconomic fundamental factor dominates the market, the portfolio managers
downplay the aggregate expectation when either the chartists expect a large change by
extrapolating strongly the log-exchange rate trend, or when the fundamentalists expect
a large exchange rate depreciation from the mean-reverting process to the nominal in-
terest rate differential. However, when the macroeconomic fundamental factor becomes
less dominate, the portfolio managers react strongly to the aggregate expectation. The
implications and significance of this choice with respect to current exchange rate models
will be discussed later in this section.
Relation to Earlier Literature—We now discuss in some detail further motivation
behind our model and its relationship to the Dornbusch (1976) model, the Gray and
Turnovsky (1979) (GT hereafter) model and the Frankel and Froot (1986) (FF hereafter)
model. First, the stabilising mechanism of the macro fundamental factor measured by
the interest rate differential in our model is largely motivated by the GT model. To
overcome the saddle-point problem of the Dornbusch model and stabilise the exchange
rate at its fundamental equilibrium, GT suggest an extension of the perfect myopic
foresight mechanism in the Dornbusch model that makes log-exchange rate adjustment
sluggish, namely
E˙ = γ[R∗ −R +X] = γX + γ(R∗ −R) (2.7)
for some γ > 0. Equation (2.7) should be contrasted with (2.4). Instead of the linear
homogeneous market expectation (the first term in (2.7)), we incorporate the nonlinear
function H of the expectations of the portfolio managers, due to their cautiousness. It
turns out that this extension introduces a mechanism that can generate non-fundamental
equilibria.
Second, the rate of change in the spot exchange rate expected by the fundamentalists
Xf in the FF model is given by Xf = θ(E¯−E), where E¯ is the logarithm of the long-run
equilibrium exchange rate and θ is the speed of regression of E to E¯. In our model, the
rate of exchange depreciation expected by the fundamentalists Xf is assumed to follow a
mean-reverting process to the nominal interest rate differential R−R∗, which corresponds
to the interest rate parity condition. There are several implications resulting from this
difference: (i) The long-run equilibrium E¯ in the FF model, which is unknown to the
investors in general, is specifically linked to the interest rate differential in our model.
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In some exchange rate markets, there may be no unique long-run equilibrium exchange
rate or the exchange rate may shift among different equilibrium levels from time to
time because of changing economic conditions, in particular interest rates. (ii) Equation
(2.1) describes a sluggish adjustment in the rate of exchange depreciation expected by
the fundamentalists. If there were no chartists and the speed of the adjustment of the
fundamentalists were infinite, then as we have shown equation (2.1) would lead to the
well-known interest rate parity condition assumed in the Dornbusch model.
Third, the exchange rate expected by the chartists in the FF model is assumed to
follow a random walk, which is equivalent to assuming that the rate of exchange depre-
ciation expected by the chartists is zero, that is Xc = 0, rather than the conventional
assumption that the chartists form their expectations from historical exchange rates.
Instead, in our model, the expected depreciation rate by the chartists is a geometrically
weighted average of the historical changes in the log-exchange rate with higher weights
on the more recent changes. Intuitively, this is consistent with what we observe in fi-
nancial market practice and survey literature in which geometrically weighted trends are
used by practitioners (see, for example the survey by Chiarella, Dieci and He (2009)).
Fourth, in the FF model, in order to characterise the temporary “bubble” in the
exchange rate, the weight that the portfolio managers put on the fundamentalist expec-
tation is assumed to be time-dependent and so is written4 $t and evolves according to
∆$t = δ($ˆt−1−$t−1), where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 measures the speed of adaptation and $ˆt−1 is de-
fined as the weight given to the fundamentalist view, computed ex post, that would have
perfectly predicted the realised change in the previous period. By assuming a random
walk process for the exchange rate expected by the chartists, $ˆt−1 is given by the equa-
tion ∆Et = $ˆt−1θ(E¯ − Et−1). Hence the change of weights that the portfolio managers






This specification is based on the assumption of the knowledge of the long-run equilib-
rium of log-exchange rate E¯. As we have discussed in the previous point, when E¯ is
unknown to the investors, or there is no long-run equilibrium, or the exchange rate shifts
among several different equilibrium levels from time to time, choosing $ˆt−1 as the weight
that would have perfectly predicted the realised change in the spot rate would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible. In our model, by choosing the weight $ as a parameter, we
examine how changes in $ lead to different exchange rate dynamics5. For the determin-
istic model, the parameter $ is a constant and its effect on the exchange rate dynamics
will be examined by stability and bifurcation theory in Section 3 and Section 4. For the
stochastic version of the model, it is a random variable and its effect will be analysed by
4In our model, we use 1− ω to represent the market fraction of the fundamentalists in place of the
$t of the FF model.
5Ideally, in line with what is done in the recent heterogeneous agent asset pricing literature, the
weight should be time-dependent ($t) and the market would have a systematic way to determine $t
based on a certain fitness function. We refer to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005a, 2005b, 2006) for a
discussion of heterogeneous agent exchange rate models in this spirit within the discrete-time framework.
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simulation in Section 5.
Fifth, in the FF model, the log-exchange rate itself is assumed to follow Et = c$tX
f+
Zt, where c is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the alternative rate
of return and Zt represents other contemporaneous determinants, which is defined by
Zt = (Dt − Ft) − b(Rt − R∗), where Dt and Ft are the log of supply of domestic and
foreign assets, respectively. By assuming that the actual rate of depreciation is given by
E˙t = ν(E¯ − Et) (2.8)
with some constant ν > 0, a two-dimensional differential equation system for (Et, $t)
is constructed in the FF model. In our model, rather than assuming (2.8), we model
the change in the log-exchange rate E˙(t) directly by assuming that it follows (2.4). This
approach has the following advantages: (i) When the log-exchange rate is solely driven
by the expected depreciation rate, we would have E˙ = Xm, leading to perfect myopic
foresight in predicting log-exchange rate changes. In addition, if there were no chartists,
the speed of adjustment of the fundamentalists were infinite and the function H were
linear, then we would obtain E˙ = Xm = Xf = R−R∗, which corresponds to the interest
rate parity condition. (ii) When the log-exchange rate is solely driven by the macro
fundamental factor Z(t), which depends on the interest rate differential R − R∗, the
nominal interest rate differential should be positively related to the appreciation of the
exchange rate. This is because if R > R∗, the domestic interest rate exceeds the foreign
one, there will be a tendency for capital inflow, leading to a depreciation of the foreign
currency. The adjustment is reversed if R < R∗. As we will see from the discussion in the
following section, the combination of the speculative and fundamental factors in (2.4)
can essentially provide a mechanism that generates multiple equilibrium exchange rates
under certain conditions as well as an endogenous mechanism for fluctuation between
them.
The Complete Model—In summary, substituting (2.3) and (2.5) into (2.4), the
dynamics of the spot log-exchange rate are determined by
E˙ = H
(
(1− ω)Xf + ωXc)+ βR(R∗ −R). (2.9)
The domestic interest rate is determined by the nominal quantity of money, the real
income and the goods price via6
α1Y − α2R =M − P, where α1, α2 > 0. (2.10)
However, for the goods price, we adopt the specification in the original Dornbusch model
and assume that it follows a sluggish adjustment process according to which the rate of
the log-domestic price adjusts to excess demand. The excess demand is assumed to be a
6As in the Dornbusch model, (2.10) is obtained by taking the logarithm of the money market equi-
librium condition M/P = Yα1 exp(−α2R), where M = exp(M), P = exp(P ) and Y = exp(Y ).
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decreasing function of the output and domestic nominal interest rate and an increasing
function of the relative price E − P . More specifically,
P˙ = ρ
[
β0 − β1Y − β2R + β3(E − P )
]
, (2.11)
where ρ > 0, β1 ∈ (0, 1), β2 > 0, β3 > 0 and β0 is a shift parameter.




(1− ω)Xf + ωXc)+ βR(R∗ −R),
P˙ = ρ
[
β0 − β1Y − β2R + β3(E − P )
]
,
X˙f = βf (R−R∗ −Xf ),
X˙c = βc(E˙ −Xc),
(2.12)
with R = (α1Y −M + P )/α2 and R∗ is given. With a constant R∗, system (2.12) is a
4-dimensional deterministic dynamical system.
Several models in the literature can be recovered from the model (2.12) under the
assumption that the rate of exchange depreciation function expected by the portfolio
managers is linear, instead of being nonlinear. First, the classical Dornbusch model
can be recovered if, under the conditions µ = H ′(0) = βR + 1 and H(x) = µx, we
assume either ω = 0 (zero weight on the chartist expectation) and βf = ∞ (the speed
of adjustment of the fundamentalists becomes infinite), or ω = 1 (zero weight on the
fundamentalist expectation) and βc = ∞ (the chartists extrapolate infinitely rapidly).
Second, by choosing ω = 1, βc =∞, H(x) = γx and βR = γ, our model (2.12) yields the
Gray and Turnovsky (1979) model with sluggish adjustment in the exchange rate.
In the following two sections, we examine the existence of multiple equilibria and
their stability. By introducing market noise and a Markov switching process into the
weighting parameter of the heterogeneous expectations, we establish a stochastic version
of the deterministic system (2.12) in Section 5. The analysis of the dynamics of the
deterministic system provides some insight into the dynamics of the stochastic model.
3 Existence of Multiple Equilibria
The evolution of the system (2.12) describing the dynamics of the log-exchange rate
depends on the characteristics of its steady states, which encapsulate the long-run be-
haviour of the system. In this section, we examine the existence of equilibria. In par-
ticular, we provide conditions for the existence of multiple steady states. The long-run
behaviour of the system will be analysed in the following section.




[− β0 + β1Y + β2R¯ + β3P¯ ],











where R¯ = R∗ + X¯f satisfies the interest rate parity condition. Obviously X¯f = 0 is
always a solution of (3.1c). In this case, the corresponding steady state is given by
S0 := (E∗, P ∗, 0, 0) and the zero interest rate parity condition holds, that is R¯−R∗ = 0,
where E∗ and P ∗ are defined in (3.2) below. This steady state corresponds to the
classical equilibrium of the exchange rate in the Dornbusch (1976) model and hence we
call S0 = (E∗, P ∗, 0, 0) the fundamental steady state.
Figure 3.1 here
When µ(1 − ω) > βR, equation (3.1c) has two other solutions, X¯f = X∗±, satisfying
X∗− < 0 < X
∗
+, the graphical determination of which is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The
condition µ(1 − ω) > βR can be interpreted as either the portfolio managers giving
a higher weight (relatively) to the expectations of the fundamentalists, or that they
are having a greater impact relative to the macro-environment factor. In this case,
the system (2.12) has both the fundamental equilibrium and other non-fundamental
equilibria. At X¯f = X∗±, the non-zero interest rate parity condition holds, that is
X∗± = R¯± − R∗ 6= 0. At the same time, the steady states corresponding to X¯f = X∗±
are given by S± := (E¯, P¯ , X¯f , X¯c) = (E¯±, P¯±, X∗±, 0) with E¯± = E∗ + (β2β3 + α2)X∗± and
P¯± = P ∗+α2X∗±. Because of the deviation of the log-exchange rate from the fundamental
level E∗ and the corresponding interest rate differential away from zero, we call S± non-
fundamental steady-states of the system. Summarising the above analysis, we obtain
the following result on the existence of steady states.
Theorem 3.1 For given R∗, let
P ∗ =M − α1Y + α2R∗, E∗ = 1
β3
[−β0 + β1Y + β2R∗ + β3P ∗]. (3.2)
Then
(1) the fundamental steady state S0 = (E∗, P ∗, 0, 0) is always a steady state of the
system (2.12);
(2) if µ(1− ω) > βR, then the system (2.12) has another two non-fundamental steady












It is interesting to see that the condition for the existence of the non-fundamental
steady states is independent of the adjustment rate of the expectations of the funda-
mentalists and chartists, as measured by βf and βc respectively. Rather the condition
depends on the relation among the strength of the portfolio managers’ response (µ), the
weight ascribed to the fundamentalists (1 − ω) and the strength of the macroeconomic
fundamental factor (βR). Note that both P¯± and E¯± increase as X∗± increases. The




hence the non-fundamental equilibrium levels decrease. Note that when βR increases to
µ(1 − ω), X∗± converge to 0 and the corresponding two non-fundamental steady states
S± converge to the fundamental steady state S0. In contrast, an increase in µ leads the
non-fundamental steady states S± to move further away from the fundamental steady
state S0. More discussion about the economic intuition of Theorem 3.1 will be given in
the following section.
4 Stability of the Exchange Rate Market
To better understand the dynamic evolution of the system (2.12), we need to analyse
the local stability and bifurcations of the fundamental equilibrium S0 = (E∗, P ∗, 0, 0),
which is characterised by the following result.
Theorem 4.1 For the system (2.12), the fundamental steady state S0 is locally asymp-
totically stable (LAS) if and only if
d1 > 0, d2 > 0, d4 > 0, ∆4 > 0, (4.1)
where
d1 := βc(1− µω) + βf + βp,
d2 := βc(1− µω)(βf + βp) + βpβf + βeβR,
d3 := βpβcβf (1− µω) + βeβRβc + βeβf (βR − µ+ µω),
d4 := βeβcβf (βR − µ+ µω),
∆4 := d1d2d3 − d21d4 − d23,
(4.2)
with
βp := ρ(β3 + β2/α2)(> 0), βe := ρβ3/α2(> 0). (4.3)
The conditions (4.1) are obtained by application of the Routh-Hurwitz Theorem to
the dynamical system (2.12) as explained in Appendix 1. When the conditions (4.1) are
not satisfied, the fundamental steady state S0 becomes unstable and the system (2.12)
exhibits complex dynamics through different types of bifurcations. In particular, on the
manifold d4 = 0, there is at least one zero eigenvalue. At d4 / 0, it follows from Theorem
3.1 that the system (2.12) has two additional non-fundamental steady states S±. Hence
at d4 / 0, the system (2.12) diverges from the fundamental steady state and numerical
simulations show that the system converges locally to one of the non-fundamental steady
states S±, depending on the initial conditions. In nonlinear dynamical systems theory,
see Kuznetsov (2004), this phenomenon is referred to as a pitchfork bifurcation and
consequently d4 = 0 is called a pitchfork boundary. On the manifold ∆4 = 0, there is a
pair of conjugate imaginary eigenvalues. This means that the fundamental steady state
S0 loses its stability and, in its neighborhood, a stable limit cycle can emerge. This
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phenomenon is referred to as a Hopf bifurcation and consequently ∆4 is called a Hopf
manifold or Hopf boundary.
Given the complexity of the stability conditions and the difficulty of saying very
much in the general case, we consider three special cases in detail in the following in
order to gain some insights into the dynamical behaviour of the general case. These
three cases help us to understand the different roles played by the different expectation
mechanisms on the dynamics of the system (2.12), including the stability and dynamical
behaviour resulting from the instability of the fundamental equilibrium. The portfolio
managers put all the weight on either the fundamentalist or the chartist expectations
in the first two cases, or on both in the third case. The first two cases include the
classical Dornbusch (1976) model and the Gray and Turnovsky (1979) model as special
situations. The analysis in the first two special cases provides some helpful insight on
the understanding of the third general case.
In the subsequent analysis, we shall illustrate many of our points with numerical
simulations, for which, unless stated otherwise, we take the parameter set in Table 1 and
set H(x) = µh(x) where h(x) = tanh(γx)/γ and the other parameters will be specified
later.
M Y R∗ ρ β0 β1 β2 β3 α1 α2 γ
3.5 2 0.01 0.25 2.1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 4 10
Table 1: Parameter values
4.1 The model with fundamentalist expectations
We first consider the case of ω = 0, that is the portfolio managers put all the weight


































Concerning the dynamical behaviour of the system (4.4), we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.2 For the system (4.4),
(i) if βR > µ, then the fundamental steady state S0 = (E∗, P ∗, 0) of (4.4) is LAS;
(ii) at βR = µ, the fundamental steady state S0 undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation;
(iii) if βR < µ, then the fundamental steady state S0 is unstable and the two non-
fundamental steady states S± = (E∗+ (β2β3 +α2)X∗±, P ∗+α2X∗±, X∗±) of (4.4) exist









The proof of Theorem 4.2 is given in Appendix 1. The stability/instability of the
fundamental equilibrium S0 and its pitchfork bifurcation boundary are plotted in Figure
4.1 in (µ, βR) parameter space. The economic implications of Theorem 4.2 are far more
significant than are apparent at first glance, and we elaborate on them in the following
discussion.
Figure 4.2 here
First, the stabilising effect of the fundamental equilibrium due to the sluggish ex-
change rate adjustment considered in Gray and Turnovsky (1979) is also present in our
model. As we have mentioned earlier, when βf = ∞, the expected depreciation rate
by the fundamentalists Xf in (4.4) is equal to the nominal interest rate differential
Xf = R−R∗ and consequently (4.4) simplifies to the two-dimensional system{
E˙ = H(R−R∗) + βR(R∗ −R),
P˙ = ρ
[





with R = (α1Y −M + P )/α2. The characteristic polynomial of the fundamental steady
state equilibrium (E∗, P ∗) is given by p(λ) = λ2+βpλ+βe(βR−µ) and the corresponding
two eigenvalues λ1 and λ2 satisfy λ1+λ2 = −βp < 0 and λ1λ2 = βe(βR−µ). So when the
macro fundamental factor dominates the speculative factor due to the expectations of
the fundamentalists in the sense that βR > µ, the fundamental steady state equilibrium
(E∗, P ∗) is stable as illustrated in Figure 4.2(a).
Second, when the macro fundamental factor is dominated by the speculative factor
of the expectations of the fundamentalists, that is βR < µ, the fundamental equilibrium
(E∗, P ∗) becomes a saddle point, see Figure 4.2(c), which corresponds to the Dornbusch
saddle-point case discussed in Gray and Turnovsky (1979). In particular, if we take
µ = βR + 1(> βR) and H(x) = µx, then (4.5) reduces to{
E˙ = R−R∗,
P˙ = ρ[β0 − β1Y − β2R + β3(E − P )],
(4.6a)
(4.6b)
which is the classical Dornbusch model. However due to the introduction of the nonlinear
S-shaped expectation function for the portfolio managers, the saddle-point instability
of the fundamental equilibrium leads the exchange rate to stabilise at one of the two
non-fundamental equilibria, depending on the initial market conditions, as illustrated
in Figure 4.2(b). Thus, the emergence of the two non-fundamental steady-states avoids
the explosive outcome for the dynamics implied by the saddle-point instability without
imposing the instantaneous (and unexplained) jump in the exchange rate to place the
system on a stable arm of the saddle.
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The economic intuition of the above implications is as follows. Consider the special
case with βR → 0 in (4.5) (so that βR < µ). When Xf = R − R∗ > 0, the rate of
exchange depreciation expected by the fundamentalists is positive, leading to a higher
log-exchange rate E and hence a higher log-price P , which in turn pushes the expected
rate of exchange depreciation to be even higher. Consequently, the fundamental steady
state becomes unstable. However, since the portfolio managers become more cautious as
the expected rate of exchange depreciation becomes larger (reflected in their nonlinear
S-shaped function H of the expected depreciation rate), the system does not explode
but rather converges to one of the two non-fundamental steady state equilibria S± =






∗ + α2X∗±) where X
∗
± satisfy the non-zero interest rate
parity condition, that is X∗± = R¯± −R∗ 6= 0, and H(X∗±) = βRX∗±.
Figure 4.3 here
For the general case with βf > 0, phenomena similar to those displayed in Figure 4.2
occur, and the appearance of two locally stable non-fundamental steady state equilibria
corresponds to the occurrence of a pitchfork bifurcation at the fundamental equilibrium.
Figure 4.3(a) shows a bifurcation plot of the log-exchange rate with respect to the pa-
rameter βR for βf = 0.8. For the given value µ = 1, it shows that a pitchfork bifurcation
occurs at βR = µ = 1. For βR > µ, the fundamental steady state is stable, but for
βR < µ, it is unstable and two locally stable non-fundamental steady states appear.
Figure 4.3(b) shows the dynamics for the log-exchange rate when βR = 0.85 < µ = 1.
For different initial values for E0, it shows that E → E¯+ or E → E¯− as time increases.
In summary, the Dornbusch model and its various extensions have played an impor-
tant role in the development of the exchange rate literature. It is very interesting to see
how the simple model (4.4) retains the basic idea of the Dornbusch model and can also
generate a number of new desirable features. The original Dornbusch model had some
notable shortcomings. First, the stability of exchange rate markets is achievable only
when agents adopt rational expectations so there is no room for the bounded rationality
uncovered in the survey literature cited earlier. Also, speculative activity, which plays a
very important role (in fact it is a much bigger component of exchange rate transactions
than those based on “real” factors) in exchange rate markets, is missing. In the model
presented here, this stability can be achieved as a result of interaction of speculation and
the macro fundamental factor. Second, if we do believe that in exchange rate markets
there exist steady state equilibria, our result shows that there may exist multiple stable
equilibria. Depending on the market conditions, the exchange rate can stabilise at dif-
ferent steady state equilibrium levels and changing conditions can cause the exchange
rate to shift among different equilibrium levels. Third, interest rate parity holds at all
the three steady state equilibria in our model, even when the interest rate differential
R−R∗ is not zero. In the Dornbusch model, the unique steady state in which the interest
rate parity condition holds is the one with no interest rate differential. As far as we are
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aware, this is the first result on the dynamics of the interest rate parity condition that
allows the interest rate differential to be nonzero.
4.2 The model with the chartist expectation
We now consider the second special case of ω = 1. That is, the expectations of the
portfolio managers depend solely on the expectations of the chartists, which follow a
sluggish adjustment to a geometric average of the historical changes in the log-exchange











































Since ω = 1 and βR > 0, the condition (1 − ω)µ > βR is not satisfied in this case. It
then follows from Theorem 3.1 that the fundamental equilibrium S0 = (E¯, P¯ , X¯c) =
(E∗, P ∗, 0) is the unique steady state of the system (4.7) at which R¯ = R∗. With regards
to the stability of the steady state and its bifurcation, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.3 For the system (4.7), let
β∗R :=










where b1 := βp(1− µ)2, b2 := β2p(1− µ)− βeµβR and b3 := βeβpβR.
(i) For 0 < µ < 1,
– S0 is LAS if either (i) βR < β∗R, or (ii) βR > β∗R and 0 < βc < β−c , or (iii)
βR > β
∗
R and βc > β
+
c ;
– S0 is unstable for βR > β∗R and β−c < βc < β+c ;
– if βR > β
∗
R, S0 undergoes Hopf bifurcations at βc = β±c ;
(ii) For µ = 1, S0 is LAS when 0 < βc < βp, unstable when βc > βp, and undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation at βc = βp.
(iii) For µ > 1, S0 is LAS when 0 < βc < β−c , unstable when βc > β−c , and undergoes a
Hopf bifurcation at βc = β
−
c .
Depending on the balance between the macro fundamental factor and the chartist
expectations, Theorem 4.3 provides a very interesting result about the stability of the
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fundamental steady state S0 and periodic oscillations7 of the market around the steady
state when it becomes unstable. In the following discussion, we focus on the economic
intuition of the different possible situations.
For the case of µ = 1, from Theorem 4.3(ii), the stability of S0 depends on the balance
between βc and βp. Given that βp = ρ(β2/α2+ β3) > 0 (see (4.3)), it follows from (4.7b)
that βp measures the speed of the convergence of the log-price level P to an equilibrium.
Obviously, βc measures the speed of the convergence of the expected depreciation rate of
the chartists Xc to the instantaneous depreciation rate E˙ in the market, or the weight
on the latest change in the log-exchange rate when forming the expected depreciation
rate by the chartists. Intuitively, on the one hand, when βp > βc, that is, the speed of
the convergence of the log-price P is faster than that of Xc, the extrapolation of the
expected depreciation rate from the chartists is weak and its impact is not so significant.
Consequently, the market converges to its fundamental steady state. On the other hand,
when βp < βc, that is, the speed of the convergence of the log-price P is slower than
that of Xc, any change in the exchange rate and the price is extrapolated quickly by
the chartists, which in turn feeds back into the market and generates instability. For
instance, if the initial values (E,P ) are above the steady state levels (E∗, P ∗) and Xc
starts near zero, the system leads to a high interest rate R. For given R∗, this leads
to a negative change in the log-exchange rate. Then the extrapolation of the expected
depreciation from the chartists will very quickly push the log-exchange rate even lower
and bring it further below E∗. This low log-exchange rate will push the log-price P down
below P ∗. Because of the slow convergence in the log-price P , this trend will continue
and the log-exchange rate will continue to drift down below E∗ until the moment at
which the impact of the extrapolation from the chartists becomes less significant for
large Xc due to the cautious reaction of the portfolio managers (reflected in their S-
shaped extrapolation function). Then the price moves back and a reverse cycle starts.
Consequently, the fundamental steady state becomes unstable and a periodic fluctuation
around the steady state appears.
Figure 4.4 here
For the case of µ > 1, a similar intuition applies. The only difference here is that,
because of higher weight µ from the expectations of the portfolio managers, the impact
of the extrapolation from the chartists becomes even stronger. To maintain the stability
of the fundamental steady state, a lower extrapolation coefficient βc from the chartists is
required to be bounded above by β−c satisfying β
−
c < βp. For µ ≥ 1, Figure 4.4(a) shows
the bifurcation of the log-exchange rate E in terms of the parameter βc, which clearly
7The stability of the periodic solution induced by the Hopf bifurcation depends on the nonlinearity
of the H function. It is difficult to obtain precise mathematical conditions for our model, but numerical
simulations indicate that the periodic solution is stable, as demonstrated in the bifurcation plots in
Figure 4.4.
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indicates the stability of the fundamental steady state for the log-exchange rate when βc
is small and the stable periodic orbits induced by the Hopf bifurcation when βc is large.
For the case of µ < 1, the economic intuition we can obtain from our results seems
very limited. In general, the fundamental coefficient βR plays a stabilising role while the
extrapolation activity on the expected depreciation rate from the chartists destabilises
the market. For example, in the cases of βR < β
∗
R, and βR > β
∗
R and βc < β
−
c , the
fundamental steady state is stable. Note that when βR > β
∗
R, a balance between the
macro fundamental factor (βR) and the extrapolation of the chartists (βc), is necessary
to achieve the stability of the fundamental steady state, and this is the source of the
condition βc < β
−




c < βc < β
+
c , a strong tendency
to convergence (measured by βR) could generate a trend which would be extrapolated
by the chartists (measured by βc), pushing the market from one extreme to the other,
even though the market does not react actively to the chartist expectation (since µ < 1).
However, the condition βc > β
+
c is unexpected and it does not follow this intuition. One
possible explanation is that a higher βc indicates that more weight is given to the most
recent changes, meaning that the chartists move closer to the perfect foresight limit when
forming their expectations. This could help to stabilise the fundamental steady state. In
any case, our analysis indicates how a simple expectation scheme like the geometrically
weighted average of the historical changes in the log-exchange rate can generate very
complicated dynamics. For µ < 1, Figure 4.4(b) demonstrates the bifurcation of the
log-exchange rate E in terms of the parameter βc, which clearly indicates the stability
of the steady state for the log-exchange rate when βc is either small or large, and the
appearance of stable periodic orbits induced by the Hopf bifurcations when βc is in the
intermediate region determined by β−c and β
+
c .
The results and discussions for these two special cases illustrate explicitly the differ-
ent roles played by different expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists and the
different ways that the exchange rate dynamics are generated through different types
of bifurcations. An understanding of this difference provides insight into the exchange
rate dynamics when the expectations of the portfolio managers are formed as a weighted
average of the expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists, to which we turn in the
following subsection.
4.3 The model with the expectations of the fundamentalists
and chartists
We now consider the general case when the expectations of the portfolio managers are
formed from a weighted average of the heterogeneous expectations of the fundamentalists
and chartists. From subsections 4.1 and 4.2, we have seen that different expectation
schemes lead to different market behaviour when the fundamental equilibrium loses its
stability. We now examine how such a mixture of the expectation schemes influences
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the market exchange rate. Intuitively, we expect to see the types of behaviour induced
by both pitchfork and Hopf bifurcations when the fundamental steady state loses its
stability. Depending on the dominance of the two schemes, the system may display one
type of behaviour rather than the other type. Indeed our analysis below confirms this
intuition. To simplify the mathematical exposition, we consider two simplified cases
which shed light on the general case. The first case explores the different dynamics
induced by the change of the weighting parameter ω, whilst the second case demonstrates
the stability property when the heterogeneous expectations are balanced in a certain
sense. We examine the first case in detail here and relegate the second case to the
Appendix 2.
In the first case, in order to explore the different dynamics induced by the change
of the weighing parameter ω, we assume that the speeds of adjustment of both the
fundamentalists and chartists to their beliefs are the same, that is βf = βc, and the
intensity of the adjustment of the portfolio managers on their expected depreciation
rate is unity, that is µ = 1. By an application of Theorem 4.1 we obtain the following
theorem that provides a result on the stability of the fundamental equilibrium and market
behaviour when it loses its stability.
Theorem 4.4 For the system (2.12), assume βp < βf = βc, and µ = 1. Let φ := βf =
βc and
ω∗ = 1 +
β2p + βe(βR + 1)−
√(
β2p − βe(1 + βR)
)2
+ 4βpβe(βp + φβR)
2βpφ
.
(a) If βR ≤ 1, then 1−βR < ω∗ < 1 and the fundamental equilibrium S0 (i) is unstable
for 0 < ω < 1 − βR; (ii) undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at ω = 1 − βR; (iii) is
stable for 1 − βR < ω < ω∗; (iv) undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at ω = ω∗; (v) is
unstable for ω∗ < ω < 1.
(b) If βR > 1, then 0 < ω
∗ < 1 and the fundamental equilibrium S0 (i) is stable for
0 < ω < ω∗; (ii) undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at ω = ω∗; (iii) is unstable for
ω∗ < ω < 1.
It is interesting to see from Theorem 4.4 how changes in the weight ω lead to different
market behaviour. The result confirms the intuition induced from our analysis in the
previous two special cases. However, the nature of the exact connection to the two
special cases ω = 0 and ω = 1, as well as the question as to whether a weighted average
of the two expectation schemes can stabilise an otherwise unstable fundamental steady
state are what we shall be concerned with in the following discussion.
On the one hand, when ω = 0 and βR < 1 = µ, it follows from Theorem 4.2 that
S0 is unstable and undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at βR = µ = 1. By taking the
limiting case of ω → 0, we have from Theorem 4.4 that a pitchfork bifurcation occurs as
βR → 1(= µ) and consequently we obtain the exact same result as in the case of ω = 0.
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On the other hand, when ω = 1, βp < φ = βc, it follows from Theorem 4.3(ii) that S0
is unstable, which is implied by Theorem 4.4. In this way, we see how the results of
Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are consistent with those of Theorem 4.4.
Figure 4.5 here
For 0 < ω < 1, the stability and the induced bifurcations based on Theorem 4.4 are
illustrated by the bifurcation plot of the log-exchange rate E in terms of the parameter
ω in Figure 4.5 for the indicated set of parameters. Two things are clearly indicated by
this figure. First, it shows different types of bifurcations when the market expectation is
dominated by either one of the expectation schemes. When S0 loses its stability for ω <
1−βR, the expectations of the fundamentalists are responsible for the induced pitchfork
bifurcation, while the expectations of the chartists are responsible for the induced Hopf
bifurcation when ω > ω∗. Second, a mixture of the two expectations can stabilise an
otherwise unstable steady state S0 when ω ∈ (1 − βR, ω∗). This stabilising effect of
combining different types of expectations is also shared by asset pricing models with
heterogeneous beliefs (see, for example, Chiarella and He, 2002).
Figure 4.6 here
We now extend our analysis on the stabilising effect of the combined expectation
schemes further when two of the key parameters βR and φ change. First, recall that
the parameter βR measures the strength of the macro fundamental factor related to the
interest rate differential. Note that the pitchfork boundary ω = 1− βR is monotonically
decreasing in βR. This means that a larger βR results in a higher weight put by the
portfolio managers on the fundamentalist expectation, which in turn can stabilise the
fundamental steady state S0. Second, for the Hopf bifurcation boundary ω = ω∗, we
can show that −1 < dω∗/dβR < 0 for βR > 0, implying that the Hopf boundary ω∗
also decreases as βR increases. This is clearly demonstrated in Figure 4.6(a) in which
the stability region and bifurcation boundaries are plotted in the (βR, ω) parameter
space. Therefore, as the strength βR ∈ (0, 1] of the macro fundamental factor increases,
the stability interval ω ∈ (1 − βR, ω∗) shifts to the left. In other words, the stability
region of the fundamental equilibrium in the weighting parameter ω is enlarged. One
can also see that the fundamental steady state can be stabilised by either increasing
ω from below or decreasing ω from above, meaning a balanced combination of the two
expectations can stabilise the fundamental steady state. In addition, for fixed βR > 1,
the fundamental steady state is destabilised by increasing ω further, leading to periodic
fluctuations around the steady state induced by a Hopf bifurcation.
The other parameter φ = βf = βc measures the speed of adjustment of the expecta-
tions of the fundamentalists and chartists. Obviously, changing φ does not change the
pitchfork bifurcation boundary. However, for the Hopf bifurcation boundary ω = ω∗, we
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can show that there exists a φ∗ such that ω∗ is monotonically decreasing for φ < φ∗ and
increasing for φ > φ∗. This feature is illustrated by the bifurcation boundaries in Figure
4.6(b) in the parameter space of (φ, ω) for the chosen set of parameters. We see that for
high ω (in fact ω near to 0.85), as φ increases from βp, the fundamental steady state is
stable initially, then becomes unstable through a Hopf bifurcation, and finally becomes
stable again through a second Hopf bifurcation. This result is consistent with what we
observed in the case of ω = 1 in Figure 4.4(b).
In the second case when ω = 0.5 and βf 6= βc, a stability analysis can be found
in Appendix 2, the result of which can be summarised as follows. When the portfolio
managers weight the expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists equally, the sta-
bility of the fundamental equilibrium can be affected by the balance of the speeds of the
mean-reversion of the fundamentalists and the extraploation of the chartists. When the
portfolio managers react weakly to the expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists,
the impact of the fundamentalists and chartists on the exchange rate is limited even if
they are very active in forming their expectations. In contrast, if the portfolio managers
dominate the market, the fundamental equilibrium becomes unstable and the active be-
haviour of the fundamentalists and chartists will accelerate the frequency of the market
fluctuation due to the Hopf bifurcation. Therefore, the combination of the reaction of
the portfolio managers to the heterogeneous expectations and the activities of the fun-
damentalists and chartists is an important factor in determining the evolution of the
market exchange rate.
5 A Stochastic Version of the Model
The model analysed in the previous sections is entirely deterministic. However, in the
real exchange rate market, there always exist some noise factors which have an important
influence on the exchange rate dynamics. For example, fundamental noise (by which we
mean noise in the underlying economic processes determining the fundamental value of
the exchange rate) or market noise (this can best be thought of as noise impinging on
the market due perhaps to the arrival of news events causing stochastic shifts in demand
and supply-so called noise traders could be incorporated under this rubric), or both. For
simplicity we focus on the case of market noise only. To capture this effect, the first





(1− ω)Xf + ωXc)+ β(R∗ −R)]dt+ σEdWE, (5.1)
where WE is a Wiener process on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) with zero drift and unit
variance per unit time and σE > 0 measures the intensity of the market noise.
In addition, in order to capture the different dynamics induced by the change in the
weighting parameter in the deterministic model, the market fraction of the fundamen-
talists or chartists (1− ω or ω) will not be treated as constant but allowed to randomly
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change8. Based on the analysis for the deterministic model in the previous sections, we
see that changes in ω lead to the existence of three types of dynamics with a stable
fundamental steady state (Case F), two stable non-fundamental steady states (Case
P) and a stable limit cycle (Case H), see Figure 4.5. To allow for all three types of
behaviour, the market fraction ω is assumed to follow a simple discrete random choice
process satisfying
dωt = (ξ − ωt−)dNt, (5.2)




ξ with prob. λdt+ o(dt),
ωt− with prob. 1− λdt+ o(dt).
This means that when dNt = 0, the market fraction remains at the original level ωt−,
while when dNt = 1, the market fraction ωt+ = ξ follows a Markov chain with three
discrete states {ωP , ωF , ωH} and the transition probability matrix P. The three states
correspond to the three particular values of market dynamics in the cases P , F and




























dωt =(ξ − ωt−)dNt,
(5.3)
where R = (α1Y −M + P )/α2. The system (5.3) implies that, when the exchange rate
reacts to the noise factors, the chartists simultaneously adapt their belief to changes
in the market. The fundamentalists rather focus on the fundamental information of
the nominal interest rate differential, and they are not very sensitive to the immediate
adjustments in the exchange rate.
5.1 Empirical Evidence
As mentioned in the introduction, a great deal of empirical research has uncovered
many puzzles or anomalies in exchange rate markets, for example disconnection from
fundamental factors, excess volatility, volatility clustering and fat tails. As a benchmark,
we use daily Australian-US exchange rate market data coming from the Reserve Bank
of Australia from Dec. 12, 1983 to Dec. 31, 2009. The exchange rate is measured by
8Another mechanism for changing weights could be based on some fitness measure, which has been
widely used in asset pricing models with heterogeneous beliefs following Brock and Hommes (1998) and
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) in exchange rate markets.
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the amount of AUD for 1 unit of USD. In total, there are 6,577 daily exchange rate
observations. Figure 5.1(a) shows the time series of the real log-exchange rate (LER).
We observe that the AUD fluctuates a great deal over the years 1985-1986, 2000-2001
and 2006-2009 (the first 800, the 3,500-4,500 and the 5,500-6,577 data points) and is
relatively stable over the rest of time period. The corresponding distribution of the log-
exchange rate in Figure 5.1(c) displays two peaks, one high peak near 0.25 and low one
near 0.65. The returns of the exchange rate in Figure 5.1(b) show the switching between
high volatility and low volatility that is typical of many financial return time series. Also
the density distribution of the returns in Figures 5.1(d) and (e) is not normal, having
very fat tails. The absolute and squared returns in Figures 5.1(f)-(h) display rapidly
decreasing positive ACs but the return itself has insignificant ACs.
Figure 5.1 here
5.2 Stochastic Simulations of the Model and Statistical Anal-
ysis
For our stochastic model (5.3), we regard ω as the bifurcation parameter. Let µ =
1, βR = 0.85, βf = 0.8 and βc = 0.8 as in Figure 4.5. Then we know from subsection
4.3 that ω∗P = 0.15 and ω
∗
H ≈ 0.8286 are the pitchfork and Hopf bifurcation points of the
fundamental steady state, respectively. That is, when ω < ω∗P (for example ω = 0.10),
the fundamental steady state is unstable and two non-fundamental steady states appear
(Case P). When ω > ω∗H (for example ω = 0.85), the fundamental steady state is
unstable and a stable limit cycle exists (Case H). When ω∗P < ω < ω∗H (for example
ω = 0.25), the fundamental steady state is stable (Case F).
To examine the effect of random disturbance on the deterministic dynamics, we as-
sume that the random market fraction ω satisfies (5.2) in which ξ follows a Markov chain
with three states {0.10, 0.25, 0.85}. These three sates correspond the three typical dy-
namical regions that the analysis of Section 4 has shown that the model displays, namely
Cases P , F , H respectively. The transition probability matrix among the different states
is assumed to be given by
P F H
P =





The principle behind this choice is that the weights are not allowed to have extreme
jumps, say, from ω = 0.10 to ω = 0.85 without going through ω = 0.25. The size of
the noises is given by σE = 0.0158 per trading period and λ = 0.05 (meaning that, on
average, there is one jump for every 20 trading periods). Figure 5.2 displays the time
series and statistical characteristics based on the system (5.3).
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NOTE. As required by the referee report, we need to have a figure, say Fig. ??, of
time series of both the log exchange rate and ω, together with the bifurcation values of
ω, ω∗P = 0.15 and ω
∗
H = 0.8286, to illustrate the impact of the underlying deterministic
dynamics on the stochastic nature of the exchange rate.
Figure ?? here
Figure 5.2 here
Figure 5.2(a) shows a typical time series of the log-exchange rate and Figure 5.2(b)
shows the corresponding return series. They display persistent deviation of the market
exchange rate from the (constant) fundamental exchange rate and irregular switching
between phases of low volatility with returns close to zero and phases of high volatility.
This is because the weight between the fundamentalists and chartists changes stochas-
tically. For different weights, the exchange rate has different stability properties. When
ω = 0.25, the fundamental exchange rate converges to the fundamental steady state
equilibrium and the corresponding time series shows such a converging tendency. How-
ever, when ω = 0.10, the fundamental equilibrium is unstable and another two non-
fundamental steady states co-exist. In this case, the time series undergoes a deviation
from the fundamental equilibrium. When ω = 0.85, there is a stable limit cycle around
the unstable fundamental equilibrium for the deterministic model and the time series
shows a fluctuation around the fundamental equilibrium level. Not surprisingly, adding
the dynamical noise to the system destroys the regularity of the exchange rate around the
(non-)fundamental steady state, or the cycle and leads to an irregular switching between
phases of low volatility (where the fundamental equilibrium is stable) and phases of high
volatility (where the fundamental equilibrium is unstable), and of deviation from the
underlying fundamental equilibrium most of the time. Furthermore, the density of the
log-exchange rate is bimodal as observed in Figure 5.2(c) and the return of the exchange
rate in Figure 5.2(b) shows volatility clustering. In addition, the absolute and squared
returns in Figures 5.2(g) and (h) display strong positive autocorrelations (ACs), but the
ACs of the return in Figure 5.2(f) are insignificant (except the first few time lags). The
distribution of the exchange rate return in Figures 5.2(d) and (e) is non-normal with fat
tails. These effects correspond to most of the stylised facts observed in exchange rate
markets.
Comparing the characteristics in Figures 5.2 and 5.1, we can see that our simple het-
erogeneous expectations model can replicate the broad features of realistic time series
and some stylised facts in exchange rate markets, for example, deviation from fundamen-
tal factors, bimodal density of log-exchange rate, volatility clustering and fat tails for
returns. The autocorrelation patterns also show the broad tendencies of those observed
in the actual times series but clearly these are not as satisfactory. Overall our results
indicate that heterogeneous beliefs in exchange rate markets can potentially explain the
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puzzles and anomalies of exchange rates to a certain extent and the interaction between
the fundamentalists and chartists is a potential source of the mechanism generating some
of those characteristics.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the challenge faced by traditional macroeconomic exchange rate models
in explaining an increasing number of anomalies and puzzles uncovered in empirical re-
search, and empirical evidence that many popular technical trading strategies are used in
exchange markets, this paper extends the classical Dornbousch exchange rate model with
homogeneous expectation to incorporate heterogeneous beliefs and bounded rationality
into a dynamical model of exchange rates in a continuous time framework.
Essentially, the heterogeneity is characterised by the expectations of the portfolio
managers, which are a weighted average of the expectations of the fundamentalists and
chartists, and the bounded rationality is characterised by the different information of the
heterogeneous investors and the S-shaped expectation function of the portfolio managers.
The model not only inherits the classical saddle-point instability of the Dornbousch
model and the stabilising effect of the sluggish adjustment in exchange rates of the
Gray and Turnovsky model, but also introduces many new desirable features. These
include the stability of the fundamental equilibrium, the existence and stability of non-
fundamental equilibria, and different exchange rate dynamics induced by different types
of bifurcations.
The analysis of the model highlights the different roles played by the macro funda-
mental factor and the combination of the heterogeneous expectations. In general, the
macro fundamental factor is a stabilising force in the market, whilst the speculative
activities from the fundamentalists and chartists can destabilise the fundamental equi-
librium of the exchange rate. In particular, the macro fundamental factor can stabilise
an otherwise unstable market when the macro fundamental factor dominates speculative
expectations. When the market fundamental equilibrium is unstable, the fundamentalist
expectation tends to cause the exchange rate to deviate from the fundamental towards
a non-fundamental equilibrium level characterised by a pitchfork bifurcation, whilst the
chartist expectation causes the exchange rate to fluctuate periodically around the fun-
damental equilibrium characterised by a Hopf bifurcation. This difference is clearly
demonstrated in two special cases where the expectations of the portfolio managers fol-
low the view of either the fundamentalists or the chartists. In the general case, when
the expectations of the portfolio managers are a weighted average of the heterogeneous
expectations, the exchange rate displays a mixture of these two different features dom-
inated by either one of the expectation schemes. Also, a mixture of the two schemes
can stabilise an otherwise unstable fundamental steady state and this stabilising effect
of combining different types of expectations is also shared by asset pricing models with
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heterogeneous beliefs. In addition, it is shown that the balance between the macro fun-
damental factor and the expectations of the portfolio managers is an important factor
in determining the exchange rate market evolution.
For the corresponding stochastic model, noise processes are introduced through the
market noise in terms of the change of the log-exchange rate (equation 5.1) and the ran-
dom switching of the weights of the two heterogeneous expectations (equation 5.2). Nu-
merical simulations show that our simple heterogeneous expectations model can replicate
typical time series and some stylised facts observed in exchange rate markets, including
deviation from fundamental factors, bimodal density, volatility clustering and fat tails.
Here in order to focus just on the underlying mechanism driving the exchange rate,
namely the different stability regimes, we have simply relied on stochastic switching
between the various strategies. The next step is to adopt some of the more sophisticated
switching mechanisms introduced in the literature such as that of Brock and Hommes
(1997, 1998) involving switching populations or that of Lux (1997) involving transition
probabilities. Incorporation of such switching mechanisms should lead to better realism
in the generated time series, however this task we leave to further research.
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Appendix 1. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1: At the fundamental steady state, the corresponding Jacobian













βcµ(1− ω) βc(µω − 1)
 ,
the characteristic equation of which has the form
p(x) := x4 + d1 x
3 + d2 x
2 + d3 x+ d4 = 0, (A.1)
where di (i = 1, . . . , 4) are defined in (4.2). Applying the Routh-Hurwitz Theorem (see
Zadeh and Desoer, 1963), we obtain the result on the stability of the fundamental steady
state. 2
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By the Routh-Hurwitz criterion, Theorems 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 can be proven. Here we
just give the proof of Theorem 4.2 as an example.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: For the system (4.4), the characteristic equation of the funda-
mental steady state S0 becomes
p(x) = x3 + a01x
2 + a02x+ a03, (A.2)
where
a01 := βf + βp, a02 := βpβf + βeβR, a03 := βeβf (βR − µ).
Let ∆03 := a01a02− a03 = βpβ2f + β2pβf + βpβeβR + βeµβf , then S0 is LAS if and only if 9
a01 > 0, a03 > 0, ∆03 > 0. (A.3)
It is obvious that a01 and ∆03 are always positive and the fundamental steady state loses
its stability only at a03 = 0, that is βR = µ. At βR < µ, two non-fundamental steady





± 6= 0 and H ′(X∗±) < βR, that is to say a pitchfork bifurcation occurs. At
the non-fundamental steady states S±, their stability properties are determined by the
eigenvalues that are the solutions of
p˜(y) = y3 + a˜01y
2 + a˜02y + a˜03,
where
a˜01 := βf + βp, a˜02 := βpβf + βeβR, a˜03 := βeβf (βR −H ′(X∗±)),
and ∆˜03 := a˜01a˜02− a˜03. Since a˜0i (i = 1, 2, 3) and ∆˜03 are all positive, p˜(y) = 0 only has
negative eigenvalues, that is S± is LAS. 2
Appendix 2. The stability analysis of Case 2: ω = 0.5
and βf 6= βc in subsection 4.3
In this case, the stability of the fundamental equilibrium is determined by the balance
of the expectations of the fundamentalists and chartists. This is characterised by the sign






























9Here the conditions (A.3) are equivalent to (4.1) under ω = 0 and especially, a03 = 0 corresponds
to d4 = 0 and ∆03 = 0 corresponds to ∆4 = 0.
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and c1, c2 are also some polynomials and at µ = 2, c1 = −β2eβ2R < 0. As before, d4 = 0
and ∆4 = 0 correspond to the pitchfork and Hopf bifurcation boundaries, respectively.
Note that the changes in both βf and βc do not affect the sign of d4 = βeβcβf (βR−µ/2).
Hence we assume d4 > 0, that is, µ < 2βR and hence c3 > 0. Thus, we only need to
focus on the sign change of ∆4. At βc = 0, ∆4 > 0 but ∆4 changes as βf and βc increase.
(i) For µ < 2 and βf > 0, we have c0 > 0. Note that lim
βc→+∞
∆4 = +∞, that is to
say that there exists β∗c ≥ 0 which depends on βf such that ∆4 > 0 for βc > β∗c .
Correspondingly the fundamental steady state equilibrium S0 is stable for βc > β∗c
and µ < min{2, 2βR}.




c (βf ) > 0
such that ∆4 < 0 for βc > β
∗
c . Correspondingly the fundamental steady state
equilibrium S0 is unstable for βc > β∗c and µ = 2.
(iii) For µ > 2, there exist β∗f > 0 such that when βf > β
∗
f , c0 < 0. At the same time,
lim
βc→+∞
∆4 = −∞, that is to say that there exists β∗c = β∗c (βf ) > 0 such that since
βc > β
∗
c , it follows that ∆4 < 0. Correspondingly the fundamental steady state
equilibrium S0 is unstable for βf > β∗f and βc > β∗c and 2 < µ < 2βR.
Essentially, the local stability of the fundamental equilibrium is determined by the
sign of ∆4.When the intensity of the adjustment of the portfolio managers on the
weighted depreciation rate of the fundamentalists and chartists is comparatively weak
(so that µ < min{2, 2βR}), a strong extrapolation from the chartists (so that βc > β∗c =
β∗c (βf ) for any given speed of the mean-reversion of the fundamentalists) can locally
stabilise the fundamental equilibrium. In contrast, if the portfolio managers dominate
the market (so that µ ≥ 2), the fundamental equilibrium becomes unstable and the ac-
tive behaviour of the fundamentalists and chartists will accelerate the frequency of the
market fluctuation due to the Hopf bifurcation.
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Figure 2.1: The expected exchange depreciation rate function H of the market expecta-
tion with different parameter µi (i = 1, 2, 3) where 0 < µ1 < µ2 < µ3.
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Figure 3.1: The three solutions of H
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Figure 4.1: Parameter regions of the stable and unstable fundamental steady states in
(µ, βR) space and the corresponding pitchfork bifurcation boundary.
34











(a) βR = 1.2











(b) βR = 0.85












(c) βR = 0.85
Figure 4.2: The phase plots of (E,P ) and the stability analysis when βf =∞ and µ = 1.
(a) When βR > µ, there is a unique and stable fundamental equilibrium (E
∗, P ∗); (b)
when βR < µ, the fundamental equilibrium (E
∗, P ∗) becomes unstable and two locally
stable non-fundamental steady states appear; (c) looking at the picture in (b) very locally
and seeing just the saddle-point nature of the unstable equilibrium. Here the star (I)
denotes (E∗, P ∗) and the squares (¤) denote the non-fundamental equilibria.
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(a) Bifurcation plot in parameter βR.














(b) Convergence of the exchange rates
Figure 4.3: When 0.8 = βf < ∞, we take µ = 1 as in Figure 4.2 and show (a) the
bifurcation plot of the log-exchange rate with respect to the parameter βR and pitchfork
bifurcation; (b) the evolution of the log-exchange rate E(t) from different initial values





Figure 4.4: For ω = 1, the bifurcation plots of the log-exchange rate with respect to the
parameter βc for βR = 10 and (a) µ = 2 > 1; (b) 0.5 = µ < 1.
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Figure 4.5: The bifurcation of the log-exchange rate E in terms of the parameter ω ∈
(0, 1) for µ = 1, βR = 0.85, βf = 0.8 and βc = 0.8. The fundamental steady state
undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at ω = 1 − βR = 0.15, and a Hopf bifurcation at
ω = ω∗ = 0.8286.
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(a) φ = 0.8




















(b) βR = 0.85
Figure 4.6: Stability regions and bifurcation boundaries; (a) in the (βR, ω) plane, and
(b) in the (φ, ω) plane. Here βf = βc = φ, µ = 1 and βp < φ.
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(a) Time series of log-exchange rate (LER)
















(b) Time series of daily return (r)











(c) Density of LER














(d) Density of r


















(e) QQ-plot of r
















(f) ACF of r











(g) ACF of |r|












(h) ACF of r2
Figure 5.1: Statistical analysis of the exchange rate daily data between the Australia
dollar and the US dollar from Dec. 12, 1983 to Dec. 31, 2009.
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(a) Time series of log-exchange rate (LER)












(b) Time series of daily return (r)












(c) Density of LER










(d) Density of r














(e) QQ-plot of r
















(f) ACF of r













(g) ACF of |r|
















(h) ACF of r2
Figure 5.2: Statistical analysis of the simulation results.
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